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Stakeholders and Takeovers: Can Contractarianism be Compassionate?
Abstract
The issue of what, if any, purchase non-shareholder corporate constituencies (that is, employees,
creditors, suppliers, customers, and communities) should have on the discretionary decisions of
corporate management has proved to be one of the most durable, if not vexing, issues in modern
corporate scholarship. Most recently, the issue has resurfaced in the context of the takeover wave of the
1980s, particularly during the latter part of the decade when control transactions became associated with
high levels of leverage. At core, stakeholder advocates were riveted by the asymmetries involved in
change-of-control transactions. While target shareholders earned consistent and sizeable returns from
these transactions, stakeholders were left in the cold. Indeed, in some cases, control transactions were
thought to be capable of inflicting highly focused losses on stakeholders. So severe were these losses
that some commentators, were led to conclude it was the gains from opportunistic breaching of
stakeholder contracts that motivated the transactions in the first place.
As in the past, participants in the stakeholder and takeover debate generally array themselves into two
distinct camps: one, which views any judicial or legislative attempt to protect stakeholders from harms
not explicitly prohibited by corporate contracts as anathema ('non-protectionists'), and the other, which
regards corporate responsibility for stakeholder harms as an innate and natural feature of the system of
modern corporate governance ('protectionists'). In a perceptive article, Romano attributes part of the
differences among scholars on divisive issues of corporate law to the starkly divergent normative beliefs
that underlie each side. For non-protectionists, the underlying normative framework is individualistic
liberalism, whereas for protectionists, it is usually communitarianism. Given the gulf that divides these
underlying normative views, the hope for a principled and durable resolution to the stakeholder debate is
indeed dim.
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Ronald Daniels·

STAKEHOLDERS AND TAKEOVERS:
CAN CONTRACTARIANISM BE
COMPASSIONA1~E?t

The issue of what, ifany, purchase non-shareholder corporate constituencies (that is, employees, creditors, suppliers, customers, and communities)
should have on the discretionary decisions of corporate management has
proved to be one of the most durable, if not vexing, issues in modern
corporate scholarship. 1 Most recently, the issue has resurfaced in the
context of the takeover wave of the 1980s, particularly during the latter
part of the decade when control transactions became associated with high
levels of leverage. 2 At core, stakeholder advocates were riveted by the
asymmetries involved in change-of-control transactions. s While target
shareholders earned consistent and sizeable returns from these transactions, stakeholders were left in the cold. Indeed, in some cases, control
transactions were thought to be capable of inflicting highly focused losses
on stakeholders. 4 So severe were these losses that some commentators,
• Faculty of Law, University of Toronto

t I would like to express my appreciation to Bill Carney, Jack Coffee, and Karl Klare
for lucid comments when this article was first presented at the Stakeholder Conference.
I would also like to thank Jim Baillie, David Beatty, Bruce Chapman, Mark Gillen,
Robert Howse, Roberta Romano, Michael Trebilcock, and George Triantis for comments on an earlier draft of the article.
See the famous exchange between Merrick Dodd and Adolf Berle: M. Dodd 'For
Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?' (1932) 45 Harv. LR 1145 and A. Berle 'For
Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note' (1932) ibid. 1365.
2 A useful review of the data mapping the incidence of mergers and acquisition activity
is: R. Khemani 'Recent Trends in Merger and Acquisition Activity in Canada and
Selected Countries' in L. Waverman (ed.) Corporaie Globalization Through Mergers and
Acquisitions (Calgary: University of Calgary Press 1991).
3 Recently, the significance of stakeholder interests has been given belated, though not
inconsiderable, recognition in the form ofanti-takeover amendments to American state
corporate statutes, which have allowed and, in some cases, required, corporate
directors to consider the effects of mergers and acquisitions on non-shareholder
constituencies. (For a review of the effect of state anti-takeover statutes on shareholder
welfare, see R. Romano 'The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes' (1987) 73 Va. LR
III and 'The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion' (1988) 57
U. Cin. LR 457).
4 In 1987, for instance, the AFL-CIO claimed that mergers and acquisitions activity
resulted in the loss of over 500,000 jobs. (Hostile Takeovers: Hearings Before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 262,
4 March 1987, statement of Thomas P. Donahue, secretary treasurer of the AFL-CIO).
See also M. Lipton 'Corporate Governance in an Age of Finance Capitalism' (1987) 136
U. Penn. LR 1; D.J. Morrissey 'Safeguarding the Public Interest in Leveraged Buyouts'
(1990) 69 Ore. LR 47; and W. Proxmire 'What's Right and Wrong About Hostile
Takeovers?' (1988) Wis. LR 353.
(1993), 43
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were led to conclude it was the gains from opportunistic breaching of
stakeholder contracts that motivated the transactions in the first place. s
As in the past, participants in the stakeholder and takeover debate
generally array themselves into two distinct camps: one, which views any
judicial or legislative attempt to protect stakeholders from harms not
explicitly prohibited by corporate contracts as anathema ('non-protectionists'), and the other, which regards corporate responsibility for
stakeholder harms as an innate and natural feature of the system of
modern corporate governance ('protectionists'). In a perceptive article,
Romano attributes part of the differences among scholars on divisive
issues of corporate law to the starkly divergent normative beliefs that
underlie each side. 6 For non-protectionists, the underlying normative
framework is individualistic liberalism, whereas for protectionists, it is
usually communitarianism. Given the gulf that divides these underlying
normative views, the hope for a principled and durable resolution to the
stakeholder debate is indeed dim.
Recently, a small group of scholars working within the framework of
law and economics (Coffee,' Shleifer, and Summers8) has attempted to
bridge the chasm that separates the protectionist and non-protectionist
positions by advancing a rationale for the protection of stakeholder
interests on a takeover event that is based on implicit contract obligations.
The genius of the implicit contract rationale is that it endorses the protectionists' claim for broad, humane assistance to stakeholders, but does
so on the basis of the non-protectionists' autonomy-based contractarian
paradigm. Equally important, the implicit contract rationale furnishes
grounds for conferring special treatment on stakeholder harms in the
takeover context.
Nevertheless, despite these virtues, close examination of the implicit
contract rationale reveals that it is plagued by several serious infirmities,
which undermine the potency and scope of the claim it can make in
favour of providing distinctive relief to stakeholders on a takeover
transaction. The most serious defect is the assumption that takeovers
constitute a unique threat to stakeholder interests. As I will argue below,

5 See section II below.
6 R. Romano 'Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform' (1984) 36 Stan. LR 923
7 J. Coffee 'Shareholders versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web' (1986)
85 Mich. LR 1; 'The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Bust-Ups' (1988) Wis. LR 435; 'Unstable Coalitions:
Corporate Governance as a Multi-Player Game' (1990) 78 Georgetoum LJ 1495
8 A Shleifer and L. Summers 'Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers' in A Auerbach
Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences (Chicago University Chicago Press 1988)

THE ADEQUACY OF STAKEHOLDER CONTRACTUAL PROTECTION

317

for most change-of-control transactions, this assumption lacks solid
foundation. Ironically, despite the expectation that the implicit contract
hypothesis would buttress efforts aimed at assisting stakeholders, the sad
fact is that the rationale has obscured both an appreciation of how
pervasive many of the problems occasioned by corporate restructuring
are, as well as the broad range of instruments that can be used to address
the harms suffered by the victims of economic change. Instead of
invoking rationales for protection that are based on opportunistic
cheating, a preferable way of thinking about stakeholder injury is
through the prism of contractual failure, here the inability of parties to
foresee future risks. So doing does more than merely provide greater
conceptual clarity to the problem of stakeholder harm - it remits the
problem to the realm of hypothetical bargains and opens the way for
principled governmental intervention. I argue that this approach is
desirable as, contrary to the antipathy to government intervention voiced
by some law and economics scholars, state intervention expands the
range and effectiveness of instruments that can be used to protect
stakeholders and improve societal welfare.
I

The form and extent of stakeholder losses

Can takeover activity harm stakeholders? As a theoretical matter, there
is no question that control transactions possess the potential to inflict
losses on stakeholders. 9 These losses range from a loss ofjobs for workers
to a loss in financial investments of creditors. The severity of losses
sustained by stakeholders following a change-of-control transaction is a
function of several factors, including the competitive vigour of applicable
markets, the scope and magnitude of the severance, and the degree of
asset-specific investment that parties have made in expectation of the
continued existence of the relationship. Each of these factors will be
considered below in the context of identifiable stakeholder groups.

9 In this discussion, I focus on losses as opposed to harms. My point in contrasting
losses with harms is straightforward. Before considering the issue of whether stakeholders did or did not assume the risk of losses through ex ante contracting, and
whether the corporation (or its shareholders) opportunistically exploited whatever
allocation of risk was agreed to, I want first to determine whether change-of-control
transactions are in any way associated with systematic losses to stakeholders. In this
vein, my argument allows that stakeholders may well suffer losses from control
transactions, though these losses may not result from morally blameworthy conduct
of another party or from some infirmity in the contracting environment.
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EMLOYEES

Consider first the case of a worker suffering a job loss following a merger
or acquisition transaction. If it is assumed that the displaced employee
was earning a wage equivalent to her marginal product prior to severance, that labour markets are perfectly competitive in the region in which
she is located, and that her layoff has not been accompanied by massive
layoffs that depress local market wages, then it can be seen that the costs
of dislocation will be relatively trivial. By incurring search and retraining
costs, the displaced employee should be able to secure comparable employment with a new local employer within a relatively short time. To
the extent that losses are sustained in this setting, they are made up of
the difference between the present value of the stream of future income
receipts from the old employer and the present value of the adjusted
stream of future earnings from a new employer, taking into consideration
any severance benefits and out-of-pocket adjustment costs. In a setting of
rapid re-employment, it is unlikely that the worker will suffer losses on
her housing investment. Nor should she suffer losses of a psychic nature
related to severed family or community ties, as there would be no need
for her to move.
Once these assumptions respecting the operation of the local labour
market are relaxed, however, the potential for severance to inflict serious
losses on labour is enhanced. For instance, if local markets are beset by
massive layoffs, then displaced workers searching for new employment
will find that the market clearing price for their labour services has been
reduced, causing losses in expected lifetime earnings. These losses reflect
not merely the losses on expected income tied to the performance of
future services, but include losses on expected compensation for services
previously performed for the employer. Deferred compensation arrangements are used as a means of bonding investments by employers in firmspecific human capital. lO These investments allow employers to increase
the marginal productivity of their workforce by supporting the development of firm-specific labour skills. Because of the danger that workers
will leave an employer before investment in skills development is
recouped, workers will bond their commitment to the firm by agreeing
to accept wages below their marginal productivity today for wages in
excess of their marginal productivity tomorrow. Since premature
defection would jeopardize the ability of workers to gain deferred

10 Deferred compensation arrangements and their impact on collective bargaining and
labour law are discussed by Wachter and Cohen 'The Law and Economics of
Collective Bargaining: An Introduction and Application to the Problems of
Subcontracting, Partial Closure, and Relocation' (1988) 136 U. Penn. LR 1349.
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compensation, they will be loath to leave their employer prior to the full
recovery of these deferred sums.
The predictable effect ofa severe and unanticipated contraction in the
level of expected lifetime earnings on workers and their families may be
devastating. To start, a 'worker may be forced to default on long-term
credit obligations such as mortgages and car loans, which, in turn, may
result in the disposal of these secured assets at fire-sale prices, quickly
depleting the worker's long-term investments. In cases where desirable
employment opportunities can only be obtained by moving from the
community, the worker will also bear sundry mobility costs. These costs
may be both monetary (moving costs, various transaction costs involved
in selling existing houses and buying new ones) and non-monetary
(psychic costs that result from severed community and family ties).
All of these costs are magnified in the event that labour market
rigidities, that is, an unwillingness on the part of workers to accept offers
of employment at rates below those obtained from a previous employer,
force workers to endure protracted spells of unemployment. Not
surprisingly, as the period of unemployment lengthens, the differential
between pre-layoff earnings and post-layoff receipts widens. This
differential will be exacerbated by the termination of severance and
unemployment benefits from the corporation and the state. Following in
train, the more serious the loss in future expected earnings, the greater
the likelihood of losses on housing and other investments. 11 And, most
tragically, as these costs increase in severity, the prospect of family
breakdown, mental collapse, criminal violence, and suicide becomes more
likely.12
Empirical studies investigating the effect of mergers and acquisitions
on labour, however, do not provide unequivocal support for the claim
that employees actually do experience losses on a merger or acquisition
event. Brown and Medoff examined employment and wage data on over
200,000 Michigan firms over a 26-month period and found that,
although mergers were associated with wage declines of 4 per cent,
employment in these same firms actually increased by 2 per cent.
Conversely, asset-only acquisitions were associated with employment

11 For instance, Shleifer and Summers, supra note 8, 50-1, report that the takeover
of Youngstown Sheet and Tube resulted in the loss of 6,000 jobs between 1977
and 1979. Personal bankruptcies rose from 769 in 1977 to 1948 in 1981. And, the
value of housing in a one-year period dropped by 23 per cent, generating a communitywide loss in housing investment from the takeover of $1 billion.
12 See B. Bluestone 'In Support of the Deindustrialization Thesis' in P. Staudohar
and H. Brown Deindustrialization and Plant Closure (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington
Books 1987).
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reductions of 5 per cent but with wage increases of 5 per cent}:i The
results led the researchers to conclude that 'the common public perception that acquisitions provide the occasion to slash wages and employment finds little support.'l. Similar results were reported by Yago l5 and
by Rossett.1 6 Interestingly, to the extent that job losses are experienced
by workers following an ownership change, these losses are disproportionately concentrated at the level of non-production workers. l?

13 C. Brown and J. Medoff ·The Impact of Firm Acquisitions on Labor' in Auerbach,
supra note 8
14 Brown and Medoff, supra, 23. Support for the claim that mergers do not result
in across-the-board wage reductions for employees is furnished by Fust and Peoples
'Merger Activity and Wage Levels in U.S. Manufacturing' (1989) 10 J. of Labour Res.
183. By examining 1981 micro data, the researchers found that, while some forms
of merger activity, for example, conglomerate mergers, resulted in wage reductions
for workers in the affected industry, most mergers (horizontal, vertical, or product
extension mergers) resulted in increases in the wages of workers employed in the
affected industry.
15 G. Yago Junk Bonds: How High Yaeld Securities Restructured Corporate America (New
York: Oxford University Press 1991) chapter 7. Yago examined the correlation
between layoffs and leveraged buyouts (LBOS) in the course of reviewing the effects
of 43 large LBO transactions concluded between 1984 and 1986. He found that ·on
an average means basis, LBO firms ... reversed patterns of job loss prior to
ownership change and increased employment after the buyouts' (at 135). These
results are consistent with earlier work done by Yago and Stevenson 'Employment
Impacts of Mergers and Acquisitions' Working Paper, Economic Research Bureau,
W. Averell Harriman School for Management and Policy, State University of New
York at Stony Brook (1987). They are also consistent with studies undertaken by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1989) (cited in Yago at 136), which found that of
2,020 large plant closings and layoffs in 29 states, only 6.6 per cent of the total jobs
lost could be attributed to the ownership change. In large part, employment
increases are related to systematic increases in productivity in the post-LBO period,
as measured by input-output analysis. (Yago found that, in the period 1981 to
1986, the cumulative productivity growth of plants involved in LBOs was 2.8 per
cent higher than of plants not involved in LBOs (at 163)).
16 Rossett analysed the effects of mergers and acquisitions on union wage concessions
following an ownership change, and observed that post-acquisition wage changes
ranged from -0.6 per cent to +0.3 per cent. This led Rossett to conclude that the
wage effects of mergers and acquisitions activity pale in comparison with the benefits
accruing to shareholders, as measured by econometric event studies. Under the
most favourable assumptions to the stakeholder harm thesis, ownership changes
result in worker wage losses equal to 12 per cent of the combined premium. But,
on assumptions least favourable to the harm thesis, ownership changes result in an
increase equal to 4 per cent of the combined premiums. Rossett 'Do Union Wage
Concessions Explain Takeover Premiums? Evidence on Contract Wages' NBER Working Paper no. 3187 (1989)
17 S. Bhagat, A Shleifer, and R. Vishny studied 62 hostile takeover contests between
1984 and 1986 and found that for those firms laying off employees (26 of 62 firms
in the sample), most of the savings in labour costs were derived from white-collar
layoffs (emanating from head office consolidations). Interestingly, the comparatively
higher costs of white-collar (as opposed to blue-collar) layoffs were incurred by
laying off fewer workers. The reason for the higher total costs of these layoffs
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Apart from the studies evaluating labour cost savings in terms of wage
and employment reductions, other analysts have focused on the effect of
mergers and acquisitions on loss of other labour benefits. For instance,
Pontiff, Shleifer, and Weisbach examined reversion of excess pension
fund assets both before and after a takeover, and found that these
reversions occur more frequently after an acquisition event than before,
and that there is a higher incidence of pension fund reversions following
hostile as opposed to friendly mergers and acquisitions. 18 However, the
researchers found that reversions occur relatively infrequently, that is,
in only 14 per cent of all takeovers, and when they do occur, they can
account for only 10 per cent to 13 per cent of takeover premiums.
SUPPLIERS

Suppliers' concerns with a change-of-control transaction arise from the
prospect that corporations undergoing such transactions will terminate
contracts for the supply of goods and services. The termination or nonrenewal of supply contracts may inflict losses on suppliers resulting from
non-recoverable asset-specific investments made in express anticipation
of a long-term relationship with a particular purchaser. In extreme cases,
these losses may be severe enough to force the supplier into bankruptcy,
generating loss of employment for workers employed by the supplier, the
bankruptcy of other suppliers upon whom the initial supplier was
dependent for intermediate goods, and, of course, the layoff of workers
employed by these other suppliers. Once individuals suffer bankruptcy
or unemployment, they are vulnerable to many of the harms that were
discussed in relation to workers laid off directly by companies.
CUSTOMERS

The primary threat to customer interests from a merger or acquisition
transaction is that an acquiror will attempt to rationalize production

derives from the higher wages the employees received prior to termination: 'Hostile
Takeovers in the 1980s: The Return to Corporate Specialization' in M.N. Bailey and
Clifford Winston (eds) Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics 1990
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution) 1-72. F. Lichtenberg and D. Siegel also
found that employment and wage losses were almost three times more significant
in administration and headquarters staff (middle management and white-collar
workers) than in production units (blue-collar workers), causing a reduction in the
ratio of non-production to production workers of 11.2 per cent in firms experiencing an ownership change compared with firms not so involved. Lichtenberg and
Siegel 'The Effect of Takeovers on the Employment and Wages of Central Office
and Other Personnel' First Boston Working Paper Series, Graduate School of
Business, Columbia University, FB-89-05 Oanuary 1989)
18 J. Pontiff, A Shleifer, and M. Weisbach 'Reversions of Excess Pension Assets After
Takeovers' (1990) 21 Rand J. Econ. 600
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between existing and acquired plants by terminating certain product
lines. If the terminated product line includes expensive goods having a
lengthy remaining expected life, then it is possible that customers having
purchased these goods will suffer from reduced market values. The
reduction in value results from difficulties purchasers may have in
obtaining replacement parts or in accessing competent post-purchase
service for these goods. Predictably, the severity of these problems turns
on the distinctiveness of the good in question and on the capacity of
competitive suppliers to offer adequate post-purchase support. If the
goods are not manufactured through unique production processes and
are not protected through elaborate intellectual property safeguards,
then it will be easier for a competitor to supply customized parts and
services.
Yet there is nothing inevitable about product support terminations
following a change-of-control t.ransaction. Even if there is no robust
market in after-purchase parts and services, the acquiring firm may
perceive that it can earn a normal or, perhaps, even a supra-normal
return on replacement parts and services. And, in the event that a
manufacturer faces economic losses on the continuation ofafter-purchase
support for customers, strong incentives may still operate to maintain an
inventory in these goods, as the failure to do so may compromise the
value of fixed investments in reputational capital. 19 This concern will be
greatest for acquirors who wish to lure customers to product lines that
are substitutes for the terminated good.
COMMUNITIES

The losses faced by communities from change-of-control transactions are
the direct result of the harms suffered by workers and suppliers residing
in the community. As bankruptcies and layoffs increase, the local tax base
of the community will contract correspondingly. At the same time,
through increased utilization of publicly funded support programmes,
the community's overall expenditures will increase. This budgetary
pressure may result in cuts to so-called non-essential services, which will
reduce the quality of community life. As the number of layoffs and
bankruptcies increases, workers who are the lifeblood of the community
- younger, more mobile workers - will recognize the limited opportunities for future prosperity in the community and will migrate to other
communities, leaving behind family, friends, and co-workers in the process. If this haemorrhaging goes uncontrolled, the community will be

19 This point is discussed more extensively in seeton

II

below.
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left with non-recoverable infrastructural investments that will be underutilized or abandoned altogether. 2o
CREDITORS

Finally, for creditors, the loss from a takeover transaction may come in
the form of wealth losses from depreciated debt. Credit devaluation
results from any change in circumstances that increases the risk that the
debtor corporation will default on its obligation to the creditor or that
there will be insufficient assets available to satisfy the debt owed to
creditors on a default event. Assuming efficient and liquid capital
markets, any increase in risk will be reflected in an increase in the size of
the discount necessary to entice other individuals to purchase the debt
instrument. As the discount increases in value, so too does the loss to
creditor wealth.
The data linking change-of-control transactions with systematic losses
to creditor interests are, like those in the case of employees, somewhat
equivocal. On the one hand, early studies seem to indicate that merger
and acquisition transactions do not have a deleterious impact on creditor
wealth. Kim and McConnell studied monthly returns to non-convertible
bondholders between 1960 and 1973 for 20 acquiror firms and 19
acquired firms, and found that there were no significant gains or losses
for either group upon an acquisition event. 21 On the other hand, more
recent studies, which parallel the rise in more highly leveraged transactions, appear to support the claim that mergers and acquisitions can
impose losses on creditors from defeated expectations. 22 For instance,

20 This infrastructure takes the form of investment tied directly (roads, utility services, etc.) and indirectly (community recreational centres, schools, etc.) to the closed
plant.
21 Kim and McConnell 'Corporate Mergers and the Co-Insurance of Corporate Debt'
(1977) 32 J. Fin. 349. The methodology used by Kim and McConnell to evaluate
creditor losses has been criticized by Asquith and Kim on the basis of the former's
reliance on monthly rather than daily returns data and merger consummation
rather than announcement dates (Asquith and Kim 'The Impact of Merger Bids on
the Participating Firms' Security Holders' (~982) 37 J. Fin. 1209). Nevertheless, after
correcting for these defects, Asquith and Kim reported results that paralleled Kim
and McConnell's. That is, over the period 1960 to 1978, the researchers found no
abnormal returns to bondholders in either acquiror or acquired firms. These results
were echoed by Dennis and McConnell in a study of 132 transactions occurring in
the period 1963 to 1980, which found that there were no losses to bondholders
from merger activity. In fact, the researchers found that some classes of senior
security holders and bondholders gained from a merger. Dennis and McConnell
'Corporate Mergers and Security Returns' (1986) 16 J. Fin. Econ. 143
22 In this respect, L. Crabbe in 'Event Risk: An Analysis of Losses to Bondholders and
"Super Poison Put" Bond Covenants' (1991) 46 J. Fin. 689 observes that the losses
creditors suffered on the announcement of the mammoth RJR Nabisco leveraged
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Arnihud found that of the 15 large LBOs he examined, the outstanding
debt of 8 out of 15 firms was downgraded, while the debt of the
remaining 7 was either placed on credit watch or considered for
downgrading. 25 Lehn and Poulsen have also found that creditors can
suffer losses from LBOs. 24

buyout ($1 billion) constituted only a small fraction of the gains accruing to target
shareholders ($12 billion).
23 Y. Amihud 'Leveraged Management Buyouts and Shareholders' Wealth' in Amihud,
Leveraged Management Buyouts: Causes and Consequences (1989) 11-2. In a similar vein,
see Crabbe, supra. In this study, bondholders were found to have suffered losses
of 12.33 per cent in the value of their bonds following a capital restructuring.
However, these results are only crudely applied in this setting as there is no
necessary link between capital restructuring and merger and acquisition activity.
24 Lehn and Poulsen 'Leveraged Buyouts: Wealth Created or Wealth Redistributed?' in
Weidenbaum and Chilton Public Policy Toward Corporate Takeovers (1988). From a
sample of 92 LBOS in the period 1980 to 1984, they found that redistribution of wealth
from bondholders to shareholders could not be an important motivation for these
transactions as only 24 of the 92 firms involved in an LBO had outstanding debt.
However, examination of trading data around the announcement date showed that
bond prices in these firms declined by an average of 1.42 per cent. Significantly, when
the effect of these transactions is disaggregated by bond type - convertible or nonconvertible - significant differences can be observed in the experience of different debt
classes. That is, while the price of non-convertible bonds decreased by 2.46 per cent on
announcement of an LBO, the price of a convertible bond increased by 0.49 per cent
around announcement. Even more strikingly, the price ofoutstanding preferred shares
(not market adjusted) increased by an average of 23.37 per cent on announcement,
with the most notable increases experienced by three non-convertible issues (40.67 per
cent). Differential effects on creditors depending on conversion privileges have also
been observed by Marais, Schipper, ~d Smith 'Wealth Effects of Going Private for
Senior Securities' (1989) 23 J. Fin. 155. The authors evaluated the effect on creditors
from going private transactions in the period 1974 to 1985 and found that although
buyouts generated increased returns to convertible bondholders, buyouts exerted no
effect whatsoever on non-convertible bondholders. They also found that 'there are only
19 buyouts, which together account for less than 2% of the total dollar gains to
stockholders, for which plausible debtholder losses - on the order of 10% of book value
- can account fully for stockholder gains.' The difference in the experience of convertible and non-convertible creditors in a merger or acquisition event reflects the
role that these provisions play in allowing creditors to participate in some of the upside
gains from a merger or acquisition transaction, and in overcoming the losses these
individuals would suffer were they confined solely to an interest in the debt of the
corporation. These privileges can, therefore, be viewed as a device for attenuating
endemic inter-investor agency conflicts. The divergence in interests between shareholders and creditors in responding to certain types of proposed transactions (the
'agency costs of debt') is discussed in Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet Agency Problems and
Fiooncia1 Contracting (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall 1985) chapters 3 and 4; and
in Klein and Coffee Business Organizations and Finance: Legal and Economic Principles (4th
ed.) (Westbury, NY: Foundation Press 1990) chapter 4.
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CONCLUSION

This discussion identified the various losses that stakeholders could
conceivably suffer from a takeover event, relying on empirical data
wherever possible to determine whether, in fact, stakeholders do systematically bear these losses. Although the data are paltry, they do not
furnish support for the conclusion that, at least insofar as the interests of
employees and creditors are concerned (the only two stakeholder groups
for which robust data are available), stakeholders suffer certain injury
following every change-of-control transaction. And although the data
show that losses are experienced by stakeholders, they are not nearly
large enough to account for the gains to shareholders from a takeover
transaction. 25 In other words, the primary motivation for this activity does
not appear to be redistributional. Nevertheless, this survey does show
that, in some circumstances, some classes of stakeholders can experience
loss from a change-of-control transaction. 26 In the case of labour, employees have sometimes lost their jobs and endured wage and pension
benefit reductions. In the case of creditors, wealth"losses from merger or
acquisition transactions have become more common in the last decade,
but appear to be limited to creditors who failed to insist that conversion
or redemption privileges be included in their debt contracts. On the basis
of these data, it can be assumed that other stakeholders, that is, suppliers,
customers, and communities, may also suffer some degree of loss, though
again, it is highly unlikely that these harms are large enough to account
for all the gains of a transaction.
II

Contract, community, and the stakeholder debate

As the discussion in the previous section shows, the causal relationship

between merger and acquisition transactions and losses to stakeholders
is far from clear. These findings place a special burden on proponents of

25 On average, the shares of target firms post significant gains (20 to 30 per cent)
upon the announcement of a merger or acquisition transaction. The gains to the
shareholders of acquiring firms, however, may be slightly negative or zero. See G.
Jarrell, J. Brickley, and J. Netter 'The Market For Corporate Control: The
Empirical Evidence Since 1980' (Winter 1988) 2 J. Econ. Persp. 49. The size of the
gains to target shareholders creates a strong presumption in favour of the wealthmaximizing character of these transactions. For a comprehensive discussion of the
empirical literature respecting takeovers see R. Romano 'A Guide to Takeovers:
Theory, Evidence, and Regulation' (1992) 9 Yale J. on Regulation 119.
26 See general disrussion in G. Calabresi 'The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase
Further' (1991) 100 Yale LJ 1211 (movement of Pareto frontier outward not
necessarily at odds with shifts along the frontier that redistribute wealth from one
societal group to another).
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specialized protection for stakeholders in the takeover context. In this
section, the rationale for stakeholder protection following a change of
control is examined. By and large, the debate over the appropriate
protection for stakeholders has taken place between contractarian nonprotectionists and communitarian protectionists. Both positions are
defective for their dependence on highly contestable normative and
empirical claims. Reflecting dissatisfaction with these polar positions, a
group of scholars working within the law and economics tradition have
offered a middle ground, based on implicit contractual analysis, that
would appear to support protection for virtually all corporate stakeholders on a change-of-control transaction. However, as the discussion will
show, for a number of reasons this position too is untenable.
CONTRACTARIAN NON-PROTECTIONISTS

The argument used by non-protectionists against the extension of any
assistance whatsoever to stakeholders is based on normative contractarian
analysis. 27 For contractarians, the sanctity of contract is based on its
autonomy and welfare-enhancing values. 28 Because individuals have
consented to undertake some joint activity, that arrangement must, by
definition, make both parties better off, thereby making society better off
as a consequence. 29 Nevertheless, as Trebilcock has persuasively argued,
even the most strident contractarians admit that the claim in favour of
the value of contract is predicated on several crucial assumptions, the
absence of which may cast considerable doubt on the central welfare and
autonomy claims made for contract, and may even support quite expansive state intervention. 5o However, most non-protectionists neglect these
qualifications in favour of a fairly narrow and rather impoverished view
of contractarianism. And, once this foundation is embraced, the denial of
any protection to stakeholders follows quite naturally.

27 The most thoughtful arguments from this perspective are: W. Carney 'Does
Defining Constituencies Matter?' (1990) 59 Cin. LR 385; J. Macey 'Externalities,
Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental
Corporate Changes' (1989) I>uke LJ 173; and 'An Economic Analysis of the Various
Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate
Fiduciary Duties' (1991) 21 Stetson LR 23.
28 For a general introduction to contractarian analysis see K. Lane Scheppele and J.
Waldron 'Contractarian Methods in Political and Legal Evaluation' (1991) 3 Yale J.
of Law & Humanities 195 (contractarian analysis attractive for its premium on
freedom and consent, as well as on equality and impartiality).
29 See, for instance, Milton Friedman Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press 1962) 13.
30 Michael J. Trebilcock An Exploration of tM Limits of Freedom of Contract (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press 1993)
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In the takeover context, the normative commitment to narrow
contractarianism supports the following claims:
1 stakeholders are seized of full information at the time of contract
formation, and, therefore, are able to make accurate predictions of the
welfare consequences of the agreement;
2 stakeholders do not suffer any disability in their bargaining with the
corporation; that is, in combination with (1), their agreements are
truly voluntary;
3 since stakeholders are able to contract with the corporation, external
effects do not furnish a basis for interference in the contracts concluded;
4 in view of the institutionalized obligation of managers to maximize the
welfare of shareholders (the principals of the corporation), stakeholders will recognize that managerial discretion cannot be relied on to
protect their interests, and they will rationally demand explicit ex ante
protection for future harms with which they are particularly concerned;
5 if protection for some possible harm is not expressly provided for in
the stakeholder's written contract with the corporation, then it must
mean that the stakeholder assumed the risk of the harm, and has
received some compensating benefit (wage or benefit differential);
6 to the extent that some future contingency having dire welfare consequences for either party is not anticipated at the time of contract
formation, stakeholders and the corporation can adjust their relationship to account for this contingency in their future bargaining; and
7 in contrast to outcomes generated through private ordering, government intervention that is designed to protect stakeholders will
invariably make the parties worse off as it constrains and distorts the
dynamics of private bargaining.
In tandem, these claims create an impregnable barrier to intervention
designed to improve the lot of stakeholders on the occurrence of a
takeover, or indeed any other event that precipitates fundamental, and
potentially dislocative, corporate restructuring.!l Nevertheless, even

31 Since these events have been fully anticipated and contracted for in advance of
their occurrence by the parties, any intervention in the domain of private ordering
by, for instance, requiring corporations to abstain from control changes or
compensating stakeholders in the event that a change occurs, will confer illdeserved windfall gains and losses on stakeholders and shareholders, respectively.
Further, the enforcement uncertainties created by government intervention will
impair the ability of other parties to order their affairs in an optimal fashion.
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cursory examination of the claims embedded in this non-protectionist
position reveal their highly problematic character. The environment for
stakeholder-<orporation bargaining may be plagued by serious infirmities. Information regarding the likelihood and magnitude of certain
events may be unavailable or mistaken.!! Endemic agency problems may
hobble the capacity of various stakeholder groups, for example, organized and non-organized labour, to negotiate effectively with management.!! These problems may be only somewhat mitigated by market
benchmarks created by the interaction of marginal suppliers and consumers. M Further, as Stone has shown, certain legal infirmities may
impair the capacity of stakeholders to enforce corporate undertakings.!5
An even more tenuous plank in the non-protectionist argument is the
claim that, although stakeholders may suffer transitional harm from
unforeseeable risks, they can correct for these mistakes in their future
bargaining with the corporation. For many stakeholders, however, the
transitional loss involves a permanent job loss that deprives them of the
ability to 'correct' mistaken bargains in future rounds of negotiations.
And even for those stakeholders who have the opportunity to re-bargain
with the corporation, the occurrence of the loss may shift the balance of
power between the contracting parties in favour of the corporation,
undermining the stakeholder's ability to extract ex post compensation for
losses.!6

32 For instance, the nature and magnitude of the takeover wave of the 1980s may
not have been anticipated by either stakeholders or the corporation. Alternatively,
the corporation may have had 'better' information than stakeholders regarding both
the likelihood and consequences to stakeholders of a takeover, which it failed to
disseminate to stakeholders at the time of contract.
33 If the number of similarly situated stakeholders in a given corporation is large,
stakeholders may find themselves unable to coordinate effectively in their negotiations with management because of free rider and other collective action problems.
And, to the extent that the interests of appointed agents of stakeholders are not
perfectly aligned with those of their principals, delegation will not solve coordination
problems.
34 That is, to the extent that the markets generating these outcomes are themselves
plagued by structural defects, such as the adjustment rigidities normally found in
labour markets, the quality of their outcomes will be suspect.
35 Katherine Van Wezel Stone 'Employees as Stakeholders Under Nonshareholder
Constituency Statutes' (1991) 21 Stetson LR 45
36 Quite simply, once a corporation has decided to reduce its production capacity
through either layoffs or plant closures, the bargaining climate between the union
and management will be altered in a way that is inimical to labour's interests.
Unlike the forward-looking nature of bargaining at the time that a collective
agreement is negotiated, the decision to reduce production activity marks a
termination of the commitment of management to the maintenance of a long-term
relationship and the emergence of debilitating 'final period' problems. In this
setting, the bargaining power of labour will be severely eroded, rendering the like-
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A final difficulty with the strong form of the non-protectionist claim is
its innate antipathy to government intervention. There is no intrinsic
reason why certain forms of government intervention cannot in some
circumstances improve the opportunity set open to individual actors,
rather than constraining it. It may well be that government intervention
is better able to render credible commitments to stakeholders than can
the companies who employ them - particularly when the risks of bankruptcy are considered. Moreover, governments may have certain comparative advantages over the private sector emanating from economies
of scale and scope or from more effective enforcement powers. In these
terms, government assurances that certain forms of assistance will be
provided to stakeholders may make them more willing to assume the
risks of loss than they would in their absence, thereby expanding the
space for private bargaining. s7
COMMU·NITARIAN PROTECTIONISTS

In contrast to non-protectionists, communitarian protectionists expressly
disavow any reliance on contractarian norms, preferring instead a communitarian vision of the good society. This claim has been given its most
cogent expression by Singer in an article that examines the plight of
employees following a plant closing.s8 For Singer, contractarian principles
are defective for their reliance on erroneous and contestable assumptions
about human behaviour and societal goals (possessive individualism, autonomy, freedom of contract, and the publidprivate distinction). In lieu
of contractarian reasoning, Singer argues for protection to stakeholders,
particularly employees, on the basis ofa new 'social vision of property law
[which] will centre on the image of protecting reliance on relationships
constituiing common enterpnses.'S9 Singer draws on an admixture of political,
economic, legal, and moral arguments to support his claim that society
needs to 'do something about a concrete, historically contingent problem. '40 That 'something' involves employee severance payments, advanced
notice, rights of first refusal of a plant with just compensation, supervised
negotiation and forced sale of plants, employee rights of entry for waste,
and damages for reliance.

37

38
39
40

lihood that management will make meaningful concessions to employees relatively
remote.
The comparative attributes of government versus private provision of services are
canvassed in R. Howse 'Retrenchment, Reform or Revolution: The Shift to
Incentives and the Future of the Regulatory State' (1993) 31 Alberta LR 455.
Joseph William Singer 'The Reliance Interest in Property' (1988) 40 Stan. LR 611
Ibid. 661
Ibid. 643

330

UNIVERSIlY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL

Despite its more humane approach to the plant closing problem,
Singer's vision is flawed for several major reasons. First, like other
contract relationalists, Singer argues that corporations (and society) owe
stakeholders certain duties, but never clearly identifies whence those
duties derive. Singer's energies are concentrated on establishing that a
relationship between stakeholders and the corporation exist because,
once he does so, the content of obligation flows logically from the fact of
the relationship.41 That is, actual content conforms to a standard
prototype that emphasizes sharing, distributional equity, participation,
and preservation of the relationship.42 These values appear to inform
most, if not all, stakeholder relationships to the corporation. However,
the stark variance in the character of stakeholder relationships within the
corporation, particularly in terms of risk preferences and risk-bearing
capacities, makes it implausible that all stakeholders either desire or
expect to vindicate these values.
Second, though Singer places a heavy discount on the currency of
contractarian reasoning, in the end his methodology resonates with the
logic ofbargaining and ex ante expectations. For instance, in determining
the content of the responsibility of the corporation to employees for plant
closings, Singer argues for a broad relational view of the interaction
between stakeholders and the corporation that is expressly dependent
upon factors such as expectations, the terms of explicit agreements,
parties' reliance, past contributions of effort to the joint enterprise, and
the consequences of narrowing and broadening corporation/employee
obligations. 4! However, despite this ·cautious nod to ex ante bargaining,
Singer never draws the inevitable implication - that for a legitimate
reliance interest to develop, it must dovetail with the actual intentions of
the parties and be subject to notions of reasonableness. And once
intentions are allowed, there is little reason to believe that all stakeholders
will import the same values or expectations into their relationships with
the corporation.

41 Ibid. 653
42 The relational contract paradigm is developed in Ian R. Macneil 'Contracts:
Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and
Relational Contract Law' (1978) 72 Nw. U. LR 854 and 'Economic Analysis of
Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich Classificatory
Apparatus'" (1981) 75 Nw. U. LR 1018; Stewart Macaulay 'Elegant Models, Empirical
Pictures, and the Complexities of Contract' (1977) 11 Law & Soc. Rev. 507. With respect
to the values that should be used in interpreting relational contracts see Macneil, who
argues that as relations expand, they take on 'more and more the characteristics of
mini-societies and mini-states' and, hence, the invocation of these broader norms
('Contracts' supra 898).
43 Singer, supra note 38, 653--61
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Finally, and related to the last point, Singer's belief that workers and
other stakeholders will wish to preserve their working environments at
all costs is not at all consonant with the realities of a highly dynamic
market environment in which the spectre of competitive, though often
tragic, dislocation is an inevitable feature. 44 Though one may not wish
to deny the non-instrumental value of workplace participation, the fact
remains that participation cannot support the non-economic operation
of plants or firms. 4s In this respect, Singer's argument is impervious to
the grim, though undeniable, logic that vindication of many of the most
humane and laudable goals of the modern social welfare state can only
be realized on a foundation of surplus economic wealth created through
Schumpeter's process of 'creative destruction.'46
IMPLICIT CONTRACTS - THE THIRD WAY

Charting a middle course between the Scylla of unaccommodating contractarianism and the Charybdis of quixotic communitarianism is the
implicit contractual analysis. According to its proponents, implicit
contractual analysis is able to furnish a rationale for protection of
stakeholder interests upon a merger or acquisition event that is based on
the parties' actual expectations. Hence, the paradigm's congeniality to
both autonomy and welfare-based contractarianism. A further benefit
alleged for the implicit contracting model is its ability to explain why
change-of-control transactions are qualitatively more destructive to
stakeholder. interests than are other economic dislocations.
In a series of perceptive articles, John Coffee, for instance, has argued
that takeovers, particularly those of the 'bust-up' variety, pose special
dangers to stakeholder interests because of the possibilities for opportunistic reneging of implicit contracts. According to Coffee:
Modem institutional economics views the corporation as a 'nexus of contracts' a complex institutional mechanism, which is designed, at least in part, to uphold
(and thus permit reliance upon) 'implicit contracts' reached between the
shareholders and other 'stakeholders' in the corporation (e.g., managers,
creditors, employees, and possibly certain suppliers). The nature of these implicit
contracts - that is, what is exchanged - can be variously defined ... For present
purposes, the differences among these 'implicit contract' theories are of secondary
importance, because in common all recognize the possibility that shareholders

44 M. Trebilcock, M. Chandler, and R. Howse Trade and Transitions (London: Routledge
1990)

45 Especially in the face of strong countervailing economic pressures
46 R. Daniels and R. Howse 'Reforming the Reform Process: A Critique of Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe' NY J. of Int. Law & Pol. (forthcoming)
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could opportunistically breach the implicit contract. In so doing, shareholder
wealth is increased but social wealth is not. 47

Once a role for implicit contracts is found to exist, it is but a short step
to finding that the asymmetries in the post-transaction welfare of
shareholders and stakeholders violate ex ante expectations and therefore
support intervention (in the form of non-discrimination rules or sensible
side constraints) aimed at distributing the gains of takeovers in a more
equitable direction. 48
The implicit contractual claim in favour of stakeholder protection is
not uncontroversial. To succeed, its supporters must first demonstrate
that the corporation's shareholders, either explicitly or implicitly, made
promises to stakeholders to allow them to share in the gains from a
takeover. Having done so, they must then show that these promises were
meant to be enforced by legal as opposed to non-legal sanctions. Each of
these factors will be considered below.

1. Implicit contracts for gain sharing on a merger or acquisition event
Disregarding the mechanism for enforcement, the claim that shareholders (or their proxies) and stakeholders actually concluded implicit contracts that require gain sharing on a takeover transaction is controversial.
However, it is important to be clear about the precise source of controversy. It is not that implicit promises are, as a general matter, implausible
in the context of the firm, just that the precise promise alleged by the
advocates of the implicit contractual paradigm is suspect. After all, given
neoclassic economics' reliance on command-based decision-making in
explaining the comparative advantage of firms over markets in organizing economic production, it should not be surprising or controversial
to expect that shareholders would make implicit promises to stakeholders in exchange for agreement to perform certain tasks or duties. 49

47 Coffee (1988), supra note 7, 446
48 Ibid. 460
49 Ronald H. Coase 'The Nature of the Firm' (1937) 4 Economica 386. Reprinted in
Stigler (ed.) RetUlings in Price TMOry (1952). Coase argues that the rationale for the
firm lies in its superior capacity to economize on the transaction costs of
negotiating, drafting, and enforcing discrete contracts for joint economic activity.
In place of costly market transactions, the firm organizes transactions by direction
or 'command' of the entrepreneur coordinator. The essence of command is the
ability of the firm to respond quickly and effectively to changing market conditions.
But the willingness of the firm's agents to submit to the command of the firm's
entrepreneurial coordinator is not costless; in return for their commitment to follow
the direction of management in responding to changing market conditions, agents
insist on assurances of fair compensation and effective protection for firm-specific
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Otherwise, the benefits of flexible, discretionary management would be
lost. 50
However, having agreed that implicit promises can form an important
part of relations within the finn, it remains to be shown what the actual
content of that promise is likely to be. For Coffee, the promise is one of
gain sharing on a takeover. The difficulty, however, with the gainsharing claim lies in its wholly unprincipled character. What is it about
takeovers, as opposed to a wide range of other economic events that
inflict losses on stakeholders, that calls out for special treatment? This
question is especially salient when it is understood that the actual harm
from a takeover transaction emanates not from a shift in control per se,
but from the introduction of fresh or more economically disciplined
thinking into the corporation, which, in turn, increases the likelihood that
corporate policy will be reoriented in a welfare-maximizing direction. 51
In these terms, the losses that stakeholders are alleged to sustain
following a takeover transaction could just as easily have been ushered in
by events unrelated to a shift in control, including: the lowering of an
external trade barrier, the death or replacement of a chief executive
officer, or the leadership of a shareholder activist.
To enthusiasts of the implicit contractarian model, the 'wrong' of
takeovers is not that stakeholders lose, but that stakeholders lose while
shareholders gain. 52 This asymmetrical sharing of gains and losses explains why implicit contractarians are so critical of takeovers and more
resigned to the harms inflicted by a wide range of other dislocative
transactions. 5!

50

51

52

53

investments. These assurances come in the form of either governance or contractual
protections.
.
In this respect, the implicit contracting paradigm of organizational economists has
much in common with the theory of contract relationalists - both theories are
congenial to understandings and expectations that evolve from the implicit conduct
of the contracting parties. However, in sharp contrast to relationalists, economists
remain narrowly focused on the actual expectations of the parties, and sedulously
refuse to incorporate values of solidarity, mutuality, and fairness unless the parties
have actually expressed a desire to be bound by them.
In these terms, the underlying motive of the takeover casts important light on the
nature and magnitude of the shift in post-transactional corporate policy. R. Daniels
'Mergers and Acquisitions and the Public Interest: Don't Shoot the Messenger' in
Waverman (ed.) supra note 2.
As J. Coffee has stated: '[E]ven if there is no net social loss [from a takeover], any
wealth transfer is probably in an anti-egalitarian direction, because employees are
losing as shareholders gain.' Coffee (1988), supra note 7, 448
Because shareholders suffer along with stakeholders, the latter will be more
accepting of their losses and will not have developed any strong expectations of
implicit protection.
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The claim that shareholders would have promised stakeholders a right
to share in the gains of a takeover transaction draws some support from
the experimental economics literature. Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler,
for instance, use household surveys of public opinion to infer rules of
market fairness. 54 Lying at the core of community notions of market
fairness is the principle of dual entitlement:
Transactors have an entitlement to the terms of the reference transaction and
firms are entitled to their reference profit. A firm is not allowed to increase its
profits by arbitrarily violating the entitlement of transactors to the reference price,
rent or wage ... When the reference profit ofa firm is threatened, however, it may
set new terms that protect its profits at the transactors' expense. Market prices,
posted prices, and the history of previous transactions between a firm and a
transactor can serve as a reference transaction. 55

Under the 'dual entitlement' theory, takeovers are colourable because
shareholders earn windfall returns over the reference price that are not
in any way linked to cost increases, while stakeholders are concurrently
forced to suffer losses.
Despite its surface plausibility, the normative force of sharing symmetry cracks under close examination. To begin with, the empirical
literature canvassed earlier does not support a clear link between shareholder gains and stakeholder losses. If stakeholders lose following a takeover transaction, the loss does not appear to be motivated primarily by
redistributive goals. In other words, while shareholders may gain from
a takeover, this transactional gain is analytically distinct from the
shareholder loss. In most cases, both the shareholders and the stakeholders lost on the investment made in the stakeholders' firm-specific capital.
If a corporation is forced to displace a stakeholder whose firm-specific
capital has depreciated more quickly than anticipated, this is a loss both
for the corporation (that is, shareholders) and the stakeholder. The
reason why shareholders gain - despite the loss related to obsolete stakeholder firm-specific capital - is that there are other unrelated gains
(synergies, improved management, monopoly profits, tax benefits) from
a takeover that are split between acquiring and target shareholders. And

54 D. Kahneman, J. Knetsch, and R. Thaler tFairness as a Constraint on Profit
Seeking: Entitlements in the Market' (1986) 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 728. See also E.
Hoffman and M. Spitzer 'Entitlements, Rights, and Fairness: An Experimental
Examination of Subjects' Concepts of Distributive Justice' (1985) 14 J. Leg. Studies
259 (if subjects perceive no morally justified difference between themselves, they
will distribute the surplus from a cooperative game equally, even though a first
mover could appropriate most of the surplus from the game).
55 Kahneman et aI., supra, 729
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since these gains lack any causal nexus to the stakeholder loss, there is no
reason to force gain sharing.
Second, even if one assumes that part of the shareholders' gain on a
takeover derives from redistributions from stakeholders, it is not at all
clear that this situation is in any way distinct from a wide range of other
non-control transactions or events that impose losses on stakeholders.
Take, for example, the recent wave of massive employee layoffs being
undertaken by some of America's leading corporations -layoffs that are,
of course, not typically accompanied by any change in control. It is true
that shareholder losses are usually the triggering event for a decision by
management to rationalize the workforce: witness the recent cases of IBM
(65,000 job losses in 1992 and 1993), General Motors (79,000 job losses
in 1992 and 1993), and Digital (15,000 job losses in 1993).56 In this
respect, shareholder and stakeholder losses appear to be symmetrical.
However, there is no reason why an actual shareholder loss would necessarily have to precede stakeholder losses. Were the management of the
company attentive to shareholder interests, one could easily imagine th,at
it would implement extensive rationalization before any loss were experienced by shareholders. And even if shareholder losses do precede
rationalization (with attendant job losses), such activity could quickly
translate into sizeable shareholder gains, while the losses suffered by
stakeholders are of a permanent nature. In these terms, the only real
difference between rationalization that occurs in a takeover and nontakeover context may well be the degree of crystallization of shareholder
gain: in the takeover setting, it is up-front and visible, whereas in the
non-takeover case, it may occur more slowly and is, therefore, less transparent.
A third and final point goes to the actual symmetry in nature of
stakeholder and shareholder losses. Even if shareholders suffer losses
prior to the implementation ofa rationalization programme that will then
inflict losses on stakeholders, there is no reason to expect that the losses
suffered by each will actually be commensurate with one another. Shareholder losses could be fairly shallow and short-lived, while stakeholder
losses are likely to be higher and more protracted. To be a valid criterion
for determining the degree of stakeholder protection, it is not sufficient
merely to demonstrate that both groups have suffered losses, but that the

56 See Globe and Mail, 25 May 1992; Wall Street Journal, 1 December 1992; and Globe
and Mail, 24 July 1992. In a one-week period, four major American companies
(Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, United Technologies, and Sears Roebuck) announced
job cutbacks affecting close to 100,000 workers. L. Uchitelle 'Stanching the Loss of
Good Jobs' New York Times, 31 January 1993
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losses are actually p~rallel. Otherwise, management could simply contort
accounting data to show a paper loss to shareholders, which would then
insulate the company from having to provide any further redress to
stakeholders.
This point emerges from a study by D'Angelo and D'Angelo focused
on the extensive rationalization programme adopted by the American
steel industry in the 1980s.57 That programme resulted in a 38 per cent
reduction in productive capacity, a 62.7 per cent reduction in the
number of steelworkers, and a 46.6 per cent reduction in the total wage
bill over an eight-year period. 58 Although both shareholders and
management endured losses during this period (in the case of shareholders, in the form of dividend cuts and omissions; in the case of managers,
salary and bonus reductions), the researchers noted that these losses in
no way paralleled the magnitude of the losses (on a pro rata or aggregate
basis) suffered by employees. Money saved in dividend cuts, for instance
($262 million), was small in relation to the billions of dollars in labour
cost savings achieved during the period. 59 Even more arresting is the fact
that to the extent that shareholders claimed to have experienced losses
in forgone dividends, these 'losses' may have had little effect on overall
shareholder wealth given the possibility of capital gains. The same is true
of management. Salary and bonus reductions imposed on management
were not consistent during the period, and were usually taken in those
years in which company-union negotiations were taking place.

2. Implicit promises enforced by legal sanctions
Even if one assumes that stakeholders actually expected distinctive
protection from shareholders on a takeover transaction, the question
then emerges as to how that expectation is to be enforced. To enlist the
state's assistance in enforcing these implicit promises, stakeholders must
demonstrate that the parties relied on legal, as opposed to self-enforcing,
non-legal, sanctions.
The role and operation of non-legal sanctions has been closely
considered by David Charny.60 In the tradition of Klein and Leffier6 1 and

57 H. D'Angelo and L. D'Angelo 'Union Negotiations and Corporate Policy' (1991)
30 J. Fin. Econ. 3
58 Ibid. 13-5
59 Ibid. 29
60 David Charny 'Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relations' (1990) 104 Ham. LR
373
61 Klein and Lerner 'The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance' (1981) 89 J. Pol. Econ. 615
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Williamson,62 Charny argues that commercial parties utilize a variety of
non-legal sanctions to bond non-simultaneous obligations emanating
from implicit contractual undertakings. These sanctions are based on the
desire of the promisor 'to maintain reputation or profitable relationships,
the concern for standing among peers, and the force of conscience.'6! For
Charny, the decision as to whether to bond promises by way of legal or
non-legal sanctions is a function of a complex analysis that, inter alia,
includes attention to drafting, enforcement, and opportunism costs. If the
promisor's obligation, as well as the consequences of breach, are capable
of ex ante specification, the more likely it is that the parties will include
the promise in a written contract and opt for legal enforcement.64 If not,
parties have two options: either bond the promise by way of a non-legal
sanction or, alternatively, abandon the promise altogether. 55
Charny's analysis of the role of non-legal sanctions raises vexing
problems for Coffee's claim that takeovers invite special treatment for
stakeholders because of opportunistic breaching of implicit contracts.
Assuming that stakeholders are capable of negotiating rationally with the
corporation at the time of their initial contract (or even subsequently
upon modification), what grounds are there for legal enforcement of
implicit contractual undertakings? In order to have enticed the corporation's stakeholders to agree to perform some service in exchange for an
implicit contractual undertaking, a credible performance bond would
have to be posted. If, at a later stage, the corporation's shareholders
decide to forgo that bond and suffer whatever non-legal sanction is
specified, then the stakeholder should not be able to invoke the judicial
process to seek redress. Quite simply, the stakeholder's contract was only
for performance conditioned upon a non-legal sanction, and, to the
extent that a takeover causes shareholders to suffer these sanctions, then
there is little in the parties' actual ex ante expectations that supports
intervention. In these terms, a shareholder decision to sever stakeholder

62 Williamson 'Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange' (1983)
73 Am. Eean. Rev. 519.
63 Charny, supra note 60, 375
64 For a similar argument see Alan Schwartz 'Relational Contracts in the Courts: An
Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies' (1992) 21 J. Leg. Studies
271. Schwartz argues that contracts are mainly incomplete due to asymmetric
information problems. If certain types of information are observable and verifiable
only by the parties, then the parties will refrain from conditioning their conduct on
this information and will instead rely on non-legal sanctions.
65 Assuming equality of bargaining power, the calculus governing reliance on legal
or non-legal sanctions is unchanged by allowing for mid-stream contractual renegotiation.
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ties to the corporation, and suffer whatever non-legal sanctions were
constructed, can hardly be deemed opportunistic. Rather, as in the case
of any other right protected by a liability rule, shareholders have simply
decided to exercise their right to breach the implicit contract by paying
the specified price. 66
This claim supports even a broader point, namely how few and far
between will be those situations in which shareholders will have both the
desire and the ability to deliberately breach implicit contracts with
stakeholders in order to expropriate their wealth. In most cases, implicit
contracts between shareholders and stakeholders are based on protection
offirm specific investment. Assuming that the fruits (rental stream) of this
investment are shared equally between both shareholders and stakeholders, any effort by shareholders to sever implicit contracts by, for example,
prematurely terminating employee or supplier arrangements will inflict
losses on both shareholders and stakeholders. And although shareholders
may be in any better position to diversify against these losses, no losses
are still better than diversified losses. 67
One plausible response to this line of argument is based on the
unanticipated effect that takeovers can have on non-legal sanctions.
Shleifer and Summers, for instance, argue that because takeovers often
entail ouster of target management, they will be unable to protect
stakeholders from certain harms. 68 Absent takeovers, managers would
ensure that no harm would come to stakeholders because they fear
consequential debasement of their reputational capital - which, in the
managerial market, means a lower level of remuneration. So valuable are
managerial reputational bonds in facilitating cost-effective implicit contracting that 'shareholders ... [will] seek out or train individuals who are
capable of commitment to stakeholders, elevate them to management,
and entrench them.'69

66 G. Calabresi and AD. Melamed 'Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral' (1972) 85 Haro. LR 1089
67 One exception to this rule relates to employees or suppliers who were receiving
deferred compensation from the firm at the time of the breach of the implicit
contract. In this situation, opportunistic reneging by shareholders is costless to the
firm because at this point the marginal product of the employee or supplier is less
than their compensation from the firm. However, to the extent that job losses or
supplier terminations occur on a takeover event, it is unlikely that shareholders will
be able to systematically inflict these costs on those stakeholders receiving deferred
compensation. This is especially so in unionized workplaces given the protections
afforded by seniority.
68 Shleifer and Summers, supra note 8
69 Ibid. 40
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Yet, even assuming that shareholders are willing to breach stakeholder
implicit contracts, it is not at all clear that managerial reputation is the
only, or even the most potent, non-legal bond standing between shareholders and breach. If information markets are effective, and if the
corporation has other implicit contracts outstanding, the breach of an
implicit contract with one stakeholder class may impact on the value of
these other stakeholder contracts because of the adverse reputational
signal emitted by the breach. For instance, if an opportunistic breach of
an implicit contract with employees is detected and understood as such
by the corporation's other present or future implicit contract holders,
then shareholder reputation will be depreciated and the overall value of
the firm's organizational capital reduced. 70 Consequently, so long as
shareholders attach value to the maintenance ofexisting implicit contracts
or on the ability to sell implicit contracts at a later date, the deliberate
breach of a stakeholder contract - even in the setting of a control shift is unlikely. 71
One possible, though circumscribed, qualification to this claim relates
to the possibility that, because of the fundamental re-orientation of a
company that follows in the wake of a control transaction, the ability of
present and future stakeholders to detect opportunistic breaches will be
dulled. In other words, if present shareholders can persuade the firm's
stakeholders that it was the old shareholders who had instigated opportunistic breaches of certain implicit contracts, then they may be able
to confound the signalling effect of the breach for the firm's remaining
stakeholders, thus preserving the capitalized value of the firm's implicit
contracts. Alternatively, if the firm's shareholders can credibly convince
certain stakeholder groups, say customers, that the breach of an implicit
contract with employee groups was idiosyncratic, and does not contain
any information about the likelihood of the corporation's respecting

70 Support for this claim is furnished by the work of Cornell and Shapiro. They
recount IBM'S willingness to manufacture parts and do repairs for its discontinued
PC Jr computer line, despite the losses it created for the company_ IBM'S willingness
to honour its implicit contract of parts and service was not motivated by altruism,
but by the signalling effect that breach of this implicit contract would have on the
value of the other present and future implicit contracts that the company had sold
or may wish to sell at a later date. Bradford Cornell and Alan C. Shapiro
'Corporate Stakeholders and Corporate Finance' (Spring 1987) Fin. Management 5
at 8
71 And even if a takeover entrepreneur, who lacks a significant reputational investment, is responsible for opportunistic behaviour, it is still possible that the
market will penalize those actors, both sellers and buyers, who transact with him.
If these actors are worried about their reputation, they may be constrained from
benefiting from, or at least sharing in, the entrepreneur's opportunism.
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customer implicit contracts, then the reputational damage may be
contained. However, both of these qualifications are predicated on the
success of the firm's shareholders in lulling remaining stakeholders into
an ill-founded belief that the firm's promises retain their value despite
clear evidence to the contrary.
CONCLUSION

In the previous discussion, I identified the defects in the claims of both
non-protectionist and protectionists. In essence, the non-protectionist
argument failed for its unwillingness to take seriously the presence of
conventional contracting failures, while the protectionist position failed
for its reluctance to consider either the actual expectations of the contracting parties, or the efficiency consequences of across the board protection. Against this backdrop, I then considered in detail the implicit
contractual claim in favour of distinctive treatment for stakeholders
following a takeover transaction. Close inspection of this argument,
however, revealed several serious infirmities. Of these, the most important relate to the implausibility of special promises for stakeholder
protection following a takeover event and the difficulties in knowing
whether these promises, even if they exist, are meant to be enforced by
legal as opposed to non-legal sanctions. Close evaluation of these
arguments suggests that the specific properties of takeover transactions
do not appear to support distinctive treatment for stakeholders.
II I

Implicit and hypothetical contracts

In attempting to discern whether or not a stakeholder group is able to
extract protection against whatever losses they suffered upon the
occurrence of a takeover event, the task of the neutral adjudicator is one
of interpretation: that is, what were the understandings and expectations
of these particular parties as manifested by their written agreement and
actual conduct? Of course, divining the precise content of these understandings is an exercise fraught with considerable complexity. Here it is
necessary to have regard to the character of the relationship that has
developed between each stakeholder class and the corporation. Obviously, the more that a stakeholder relationship veers away from reliance on
discrete, presentiated contracts, the more plausible a claim in favour of
the existence of implicit contractual understandings. Further buttressing
this claim is evidence ofconcentrated (that is, non-diversified) stakeholder
investments in firm-specific capital or of stakeholder reliance on deferred
compensation arrangements. But, in undertaking this analysis, it is
important to bear in mind the various caveats about the scope and exist-
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ence of implicit contracts discussed in the last section. Though not insurmountable, stakeholders must discharge a heavy burden in demonstrating the existence of these implicit contractual understandings, and the
consequences that flow from them. Particularly in the light of the selfenforcing nature of most implicit contractual undertakings· via non-legal
sanctions, it is unlikely that these obligations are able to undergird
substantial relief for stakeholders in the takeover setting.
However, if, after the conclusion of this interpretive exercise, it is
determined that stakeholder losses are not subject to implicit or explicit
contractual protections, does it follow that stakeholders must shoulder the
full losses entailed by a takeover event? Under modern contract law
theory, the fact that the parties did not turn their minds to a disputed
risk in their contractual negotiations may, depending on the underlying
nature of the risk, support relief for the parties based on doctrines of
mutual mistake or frustration. In this vein, Scott has argued that it is only
certain types of risks (exogenous or remote risks that lie beyond the costeffective control of the parties) that ground relief from promises.72 In
contrast, those risks that are endogenous to the parties, are less likely to
invite relief as the parties themselves should have been able to allocate
the risks at the time of contract.
Although the conclusion that a risk was not allocated between the
parties seems straightforward, a decision to relieve a party from
performance on grounds of mutual mistake or frustration focuses on
what the parties would have done had they been apprised of the risk at
the time of formation (gap filling via hypothetical contracting). It is, of
course, apparent that whereas the interpretive enterprise is informed by
the actual expectations of the parties, the gap-filling exercise is not - that
is, the parties never formed any expectations. Consequently, whoever is
charged with adjudicating a dispute over such remote risks is, barring
any institutional limitations, free to invoke a fairly broad-based instrumental calculus that will take into account the effects of a certain rule not
just on the parties before it, but, as well, on other similarly situated
parties.
In the context of stakeholders and takeovers, it is arguable that the
parties, rather than having negotiated an explicit or implicit allocation of
risk, never turned their attention to the issue of dislocation from a
takeover transaction. This interpretation is plausible in the light of the
dramatic and relatively recent impact that globalization has had on

72 R. Scott 'A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts' (1990)
19 J. Leg. Studies 597
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domestic product, capital, and labour markets. It is, of course, these
pressures that are the substantial motivating forces behind the takeover
wave, as well as the recent swell in restructuring and rationalization
activity among the Fortune 500 companies.
In the following analysis, I consider what the likely configuration of
both implicit and hypothetical contracts between each stakeholder group
and the corporation is likely to be regarding the rise of the unforeseen
risks of a takeover transaction.'! In doing so, I focus on two stakeholder
groups: creditors and employees.'· I readily acknowledge the malleability
of the hypothetical contracting exercise, particularly its capacity to
support a wide range of outcomes depending on the assumptions the
interpreting party uses regarding relevant expectations (the actual
parties, or some broader group of similarly situated parties) and the
quality and nature of the environment in which the parties bargained
(full or only imperfect information, degree of rationality ofparties).75 The
choice of the assumptions that are incorporated into the hypothetical
bargaining exercise is related, of course, to preferences over broader
normative values.'6 Once, however, scope is allowed for the inclusion of
values that are external to the parties' own, the analysis quickly devolves
into a straightforward general welfare analysis. And, if broader welfare
considerations are used to inform questions of responsibility, there is no
inherent reason that responsibility for contractual failure, particularly
when it does not derive from strategic behaviour of one of the parties,
must be resolved by an ex post transfer of wealth from one contracting
party to the other. It may be appropriate for society, rather than either
of the contracting parties, to bear the responsibility for assisting the
victims of contractual failure."

73 My reliance on a hypothetical as opposed to an actual implicit contract resembles
somewhat the analysis invoked by Charny (supra note 60) to determine grounds
for intervening in implicit contracts. However, his grounds for intervention are
considerably broader than the exogenous risk rationale I propose. Charny would
allow intervention whenever parties rely on non-legal sanctions mistakenly, or when
it is infeasible for rational parties to draft enforceable terms, or when the law can
improve the transactors' welfare through a policy of intervention.
74 In extreme situations, these groups illustrate the weakest and strongest cases for
stakeholder protection, respectively.
75 For a lucid analysis see David Charny 'Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative
Structure of Contract Interpretation' (1991) 89 Mich. LR 1815. Charny refers to
these two groups of factors as generalization and idealization, respectively (at
1820-1).
76 R. Craswell 'Contract Law, Default Rules and the Philosophy of Promising' (1989)
88 Mich. LR 489
77 This point is elegantly made in Trebilcock, supra note 30.
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Therefore, to provide some discipline to this inquiry, the hypothetical
contracting framework I use takes into consideration the actual risk
preferences of each stakeholder class, as well as their risk-bearing
capacity.78 This framework does not, however, correct for the possibility
that some cognitive defect79 or perverse preference80 of the parties may
distort optimal arrangements. As a basis for intervening in the contracts
of stakeholders and the corporation, both cognitive defects and perverse
preference problems are clearly at odds with some of the core tenets of
normative contractarianism, particularly the premium that it attaches to
enabling private parties to order their affairs in the way(s) that brings
each of them the greatest utility. Ifconsent based on full information and
voluntariness is not sufficient to trigger contractual obligation, then the
certainty and integrity of the private ordering regime will be under-

78 In this respect, the analysis is very much in the spirit of R. Posner and A
Rosenfeld 'Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic
Analysis' (1977) 6 J. ug. Studies 83, and contrasts sharply with the sharing rule
for unforeseen events proposed by Charles Fried Contracts as Promise (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press 1981) at 60-1.
79 In the stakeholder debate, the most commonly asserted cognitive defect relates to
the excessive discounting of future events because of the decision-maker's lack of
personal familiarity with a low-probability event such as the possibility of loss
following a merger or acquisition. This is the so-called availability heuristic. For a
full discussion see Tversky and Kahneman 'Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases' in D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, and A Tversky Judgment uruler Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases (1987).
80 Perverse preference problems relate not to any inherent cognitive limitation of one
of the contracting parties, but to the nature of the preferences that inform one or
both of the parties' contracting conduct. For instance, because of risk perversion, a
stakeholder who had a full ex ante appreciation of both the nature and probability
of a loss from a takeover may decide to assume the risk of the event in return for
some level of compensation. If the assumed risk crystallizes later, it could, under this
rationale, be argued that the stakeholder should be relieved of suffering this loss
because of her earlier 'gambling' behaviour. (On gambling and contracts, see: R. Unger
'The Critical Legal Studies Movement' (1983) 96 Harv. LR 563.)
Alternatively, being only marginally more consistent with the normative contractarian model, one could argue that even though the stakeholder agreed to assume
the risk, she really did not want to, but lacked the self-discipline necessary to resist
the lure of ex ante compensation. Sunstein describes this phenomenon as a problem
of second-order preferences; that is, when individuals have preferences (unhappiness)
about their own preferences. (These problems are discussed in C. Sunstein 'Disrupting
Voluntary Transactions' inJ. Pennock andJ. Chapman (eds) MarketsarulJustice: Nomos
XXXI (New York: New York University Press 1989.) Recognition of the role of secondorder preferences means that governments should limit the choices available to stakeholders so that they will opt to consume more intensely desired goods. For example,
a worker who wishes to achieve security of tenure may be unable to resist the
temptation to trade off this security for increased current wages, and may, therefore,
benefit from government intervention designed to coerce the consumption ofincreased
security of tenure.
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mined. Further, fundamental fairness concerns are raised if the corporation is forced to shoulder the costs of stakeholder bargaining idiosyncracies.
CREDITORS

As measured against both implicit and hypothetical contract tests, of all

the stakeholder groups, creditors appear to enjoy the weakest grounds
for ex post intervention. This conclusion is directly at odds with the
thrust of legal scholars who believe that creditors should be protected by
law from the harms of a merger or acquisition event. 8l
First, protection for creditors cannot be justified on the grounds of
implicit contractual understandings. In contrast to other stakeholders, the
relationship ofcreditors to the corporation is based on extremely detailed
and explicit contractual understandings. If creditors are concerned with
the risks of a certain event, protection against that event can be stipulated
in debt covenants, the breach of which will accelerate the repayment of
the loan. 82 Moreover, to the extent that creditors are unable to anticipate
fully all future risks, they can construct a diversified portfolio of
investments that will limit the losses they sustain on a given transaction.
For these reasons, the claim that creditors are, or should be, the beneficiaries ofactual implicit contracts concluded with the corporation should
be rejected.
Concern over the structure of the bargaining environment in which
stakeholder contracts are concluded furnishes no stronger rationale for
hypothetical contractual protection. Market pricing forces, assisted by
both underwriter monitoring and review and by credit rating agencies,
provide little reason for believing that creditors will be made to bear risks
that are knowable at the time of contract formation, but without appropriate compensation.8~ This claim is reinforced by the less severe coordination problems that are faced by creditors in generating and
analysing information. In comparison, for instance, to shareholders,
creditors usually have more concentrated investments in a given instrument, and, therefore, are more likely to be able to overcome free rider

81 D. Harvey 'Bondholders' Rights and the Case for a Fiduciary Duty' (1991) 65 St
John's LR 1023; M. McDaniel 'Bondholders and Corporate Governance' (1986) 41
Bus. Lawyer 413; 'Bondholders and Stockholders' (1988) J. Corp. Law 205
82 C. Smith and J. Warner 'On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants' (1979) 7 J. Fin. Econ. 11 7
83 See generally Beatty and Ritter 'Investment Banking Reputation and the
Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings' (1986) 15 J. Fin. Econ. 213, 214, 216-22;
R. Gilson and R. Kraakman 'The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency' (1984) 70 Va.
LR 549, 618-21.
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and holdout problems. Indeed, the ability of creditors to impound information of changed market conditions is powerfully demonstrated by
the event risk protections (conversion privileges, poison puts) that
creditors insisted be incorporated into their contracts after the large
leveraged buyouts that were consummated in the latter part of the
1980s.84 This conclusion is reinforced by the wealth, sophistication, and
rationality that characterizes most voluntary creditors.
EMPLOYEES

The highly relational character of most corporate-employee relationships,
combined with the difficulties in diversifying away the risks of firmspecific human capital investment, renders it likely that at least some
classes of employees are the intended beneficiaries of implicit contracts
- although it is unclear whether these undertakings were meant to be
enforced by legal as opposed to non-legal sanctions. 8s The claim in favour
of implicit contracts is strongest for those employees whose relationship
to the corporation is not subject to modification through formalized
governance processes, and who are receiving or about to receive
compensation in excess of their marginal product to the firm. By laying
off these employees permanently, shareholders can appropriate the value
of the income previously forgone by employees, without suffering any
direct loss. However, as discussed previously, opportunistic firing of these
employees may, if detected, impose indirect losses on the shareholders
through debased reputational capital. It is less plausible, however, that
employees having made firm-specific human capital investments, but
whose compensation is still below their marginal product to the firm, are
subject to implicit contractual protections. Mter all, ex ante, employees
would assume that the depreciated price for their services would,
assuming their continuing value to the firm, be sufficient to bond the
shareholders' performance.
Even if the scope of implicit contractual protections concluded by the
parties is confined to employees in receipt of deferred compensation,
however, concerns over defects in the process by which either explicit or
implicit contractual understandings were concluded may undergird
protection for employee stakeholders. This protection is, of course, based

84 T. Hurst and L. McGuinness 'The Corporation, The Bondholder and Fiduciary
Duties' (1991) 10 J. Law & Commerce 187 at 199
85 To the extent that suppliers are closely integrated into the operations of upstream
consumers and, therefore, wholly dependent on them, their need for protection
against the harms from a takeover analytically resembles that of employees and
should be subject to the same policy response.
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on hypothetical contractual understandings. For unionized employees,
defects in the collective bargaining process, particularly in terms of the
limited access that unions have to firm-specific information bearing on
the likely risks of a major plant closure or restructuring, colours the
fairness of the concluded contracts. Since there is no incentive for
management to reveal (or even to produce) information to employees
that would suggest a higher than expected likelihood of a disruptive
transaction, employees may well bargain on the basis of false premises.
And, in the light of the sluggishness of labour markets in adjusting to
information, and the highly particularized probability distribution of a
merger or acquisition occurring for each firm, market benchmarks will
play only a marginal role in correcting mistaken assumptions. These
problems are exacerbated by the presence of internal union agency
problems. 86
Moreover, even if employees are able to obtain all of the information
in management's possession regarding the likelihood of a merger or
acquisition transaction, this information may still be less than is necessary
to calculate the future likelihood of such a transaction. With inadequate
information, labour representatives are hobbled in their capacity to
bargain effectively, thereby increasing the likelihood that bargaining
outcomes will deviate from arrangements that have had been concluded
in a setting of equal bargaining power and full information. Following
Knight, it can be argued that the mergers and acquisitions wave of the
1980s was so remote as to be unpredictable and uncertain to employees
concluding contracts several decades ago, and therefore was a risk that
was not subject to allocation through the bargaining process. 87 This claim

86 Because of the scant likelihood that the preferences in a union will be homogeneous across the entire membership, union representatives will be forced to choose
from among competing preferences in the course of negotiating a collective
agreement with management (see B. Kaufman and J. Martinez-Vazquez 'The RossDunlop Debate and Union Wage Concessions: A Median Voter Analysis' (1987) 8
J. of Lab. Res. 291; P. Cappelli and W. Sterling 'Union Bargaining Decisions and
Contract Ramifications: The 1982 and 1984 Auto Agreements' (1988) 41 Indust. and
Lab. Rei. Rev. 195). This selection process invariably means that the preferences of
some workers will weigh more heavily than the preferences of other workers.
Typically, this means that union representatives will focus on the preferences of the
median voter, as her support (and the support of inframarginal voters) will be
necessary to ensure ratification of a collective agreement under a simple majority
voting rule (see B. Howard 'The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of
Economic Resources' (1943) 58 Q. J. of Econ. 27). Obviously, the prospects for nonunionized workers to be able to overcome innate collective action problems is much
less certain.
87 Events of this kind differ from risky events that, although having a probabilistic
character, can be anticipated and allocated in the contracting process. F. Knight
Risk and Uncertainty (1921)
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can be supported by referring to the myriad factors that combined to
ignite the restructuring activity of the 1980s, and the difficulties that
employees would have in foreseeing any or all of them, and in discerning
their implications. These factors include: the secular decline in levels of
trade protection, the dramatic increases in capital mobility, the development of a speculative grade investment bond market, significant
innovation in the telecommunications industry, and the ascendancy of
Japan and the newly industrialized countries in the world economy. And,
although mergers and acquisitions are cyclical phenomena, previous
consolidation waves were motivated principally by financial diversification
objectives, that is, conglomeratization, which posed the least serious
threat to stakeholder interests. 88
By contrast, it is important to acknowledge that not all employees
entered into contractual relationships with the corporation several
decades ago, when it would have been most difficult to anticipate the
coming takeover wave. Many employees may have concluded first-time
contracts with the corporation immediately prior to or during the onslaught of the mergers and acquisitions wave, and, consequently, would
possess some capacity to anticipate the effect of these events on their
future welfare, and to incorporate this information into their bargaining.
There is some evidence for the claim that organized employees have been
able - at least in the recent past - to anticipate the harmful effects of
mergers and acquisitions activity. Anecdotal data from the United States
shows that collective agreements between labour and management
increasingly include terms that provide benefits to employees in the event
of a merger or acquisition. 89

88 Daniels, supra note 51
89 E. Kassalow 'Concession Bargaining: Towards New Roles for American Unions and
Managers' (1988) 127 Int. lAb. Rev. Kassalow reports that the merger mania
occurring in the United States has exerted a profound effect on union behaviour.
Not only have unions bargained for various notice and successorship clauses, but
have also played an important role in the restructuring process, even to the point
of arranging employee buyouts and identifying white knight acquirors. Although I
was unable to identify provisions in Canadian collective agreements that related
specifically to mergers and acquisitions, there is evidence that collective agreements
have increasingly included provisions that explicitly provide employees with
severance benefits and notice upon a permanent layoff. Whereas in 1980, 34.9 per
cent and 47.3 per cent of collective agreements negotiated in Canada did not include
provision for either severance or notice, respectively, by 1989 these percentages
dropped to 27.3 per cent and 40.3 per cent (The Current Industrial Scene in Caruula
(1989)). An example of the specific type of contractual commitments extracted by
labour from management in response to a plant closure can be observed in the
merger of Carling O'Keefe and Molson breweries. Since the merger was expected
to entail the loss of 1,400 to 7,000 jobs, the unions negotiated for a series of
benefits for displaced employees, including generous severance pay, early retirement
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Additional support for the position that stakeholders have been able
to bargain for the risks of harm from mergers and acquisitions can be
derived from the recent work of Triantis, who has argued that while
individuals may have difficulty in envisaging and bargaining for certain
specific future risks, they may be more adept at foreseeing general
categories of future risk (in this case, risk of increased leverage, layoffs,
and so forth) that subsume these more particularized risks, even to the
point of attaching rough probabilities to them. 90 The difficulty, however,
with assuming that stakeholder bargaining on the basis of generalized as
opposed to specific risks has taken place, is that the probability of even
the general class of restructuring and rationalization risks has increased
so significantly over the past several decades as to render earlier
bargaining outcomes deeply suspect.
In sum, evidence respecting the capacity of organized employee
stakeholders to foresee the risks of harms resulting from mergers and
acquisitions activity is simply too amorphous and conjectural to support
robust conclusions. As the time between contract formation and the
commencement of mergers and acquisitions activity narrows, the capacity
to foresee both the likelihood and effect of the merger wave increases
correspondingly. For these groups, a strong presumption in favour of the
proposition that mergers and acquisitions activity was foreseeable should
be operative. Other employee stakeholders, however, may have had less
opportunity to anticipate harms from mergers and acquisitions in
particular, and restructuring and rationalization in general, and,
therefore, in the absence ofexplicit or implicit contractual protection, the
content of their bargains is rendered problematic. These groups may be
deserving of some type of protection from losses occasioned by a

pension benefits for older employees, continuation of health and dental benefits,
and career counselling. See Canadian Labour Views Co. Ltd. 'Facts and Trends'
reports. Of course, these data, although consistent with the claim that the risks of
permanent layoffs have only recently been identified, cannot be construed as
dispositive confirmation of that result.
90 G. Triantis 'Contractual Allocations of Unknown Risks: A Critique of the Doctrine
of Commercial Impracticability' (1992) 42 UTLJ 450. Triantis draws on the work
of Fischoff, Slovic, and Lichenstein 'Fault Trees: Sensitivity of Estimated Failure
Probabilities to Problem Representation' (1978) 4 J. Exper. Psych.: Human Perception
and Performance 330, who found that the probability estimates fashioned by
individuals who were exposed to complete fault trees as to why a car would not
start were similar to the estimates fashioned by individuals who had access only to
pruned fault trees. Following Triantis, it can be argued that, although labour may
not have been able to foresee specific harms from mergers and acquisitions, it could
have anticipated the likelihood of some rationalization and restructuring activity, of
which merger and acquisition activity is simply a subset, and extracted appropriate
ex ante protections and compensation from the firm.
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takeover, though it is not necessarily clear that the corporation should
bear the entire responsibility for providing such protection. Finally, it
should be emphasized that the analysis developed above with respect to
organized employees applies with equal or greater force to unorganized
employees, who are even less likely to be able to overcome endemic
collective problems in the bargaining process.
CONCLUSION

The strongest rationales for stakeholder protection in the takeover
context were based on defects in the ability of stakeholders to anticipate
the likelihood of dramatic corporate restructuring and rationalization
activity. This argument applied most forcefully for employees, and, by
extension, to some supplier groups having a status analagous to employees. On the other hand, most voluntary creditors do not appear on
either implicit or hypothetical contract rationales to be deserving of any
ex post intervention. Although these groups may have suffered some
transitional harm from takeover activity, they are well suited to insure
against these risks, and to correct for them in their future contracts with
the corporation.

Conclusion
Given the premium on providing assistance to employee and some
supplier stakeholders on a takeover event, the question then becomes,
what form should that protection take and who should be responsible for
providing it? If the responsibility for the loss is lodged in an implicit
contractual understanding between the corporation and the stakeholder,
then the answer to this question is relatively straightforward: the
corporation should be obligated to the stakeholder to the degree contemplated by the agreement. Much more complicated, however, is how
to deal with stakeholder losses when the corporation and stakeholders
completely failed to contract for the possibility of takeover-related
displacement. If, as argued above, welfare-based hypothetical contracts
are used to determine responsibility, the connection between loss and
corporate responsibility is attenuated, especially in cases where both
parties suffered from information failures.
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to detail the precise
instrument mix, one can well imagine a hypothetical contractual rationale
that is capable of supporting broad relief for those employees sustaining
unanticipated losses from a takeover event. And, depending on the comparative advantages of state versus private delivery of this assistance measured by administrative efficiency, control of employee and company
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moral hazard problems, fairness of delivery, and so on - a well-demarcated role for the state in delivering several of these policies could be
supported. As I have argued elsewhere, these policies may include, inter
alia, plant closure legislation, mandatory successorship rights, and
mandatory bargaining,91 the idea being that state intervention should be
aimed at easing the adjustment to takeovers rather than attempting to
restrict or, even worse, preventing these events from occurring in the
first place. This follows naturally from the fact that, by and large, the
empirical evidence provides overwhelming support for the claim that
takeovers are Pareto-efficient transactions.
In the takeover case, one important advantage of state intervention is
that it can supplement, rather than substitute for, private ordering. That
is, the state's programmes could expand, accordion-like, to envelop only
those employees who are truly deserving of protection under the mutual
mistake model developed above. If the parties have actually contracted,
either explicitly or implicitly, for protection, the state would be bound,
in the absence of some other compelling rationale for intervention, to
defer to these arrangements.
In considering the appropriate ambit of state intervention, it is important to bear in mind one of the central themes of this article: to the
extent that stakeholders suffer losses on a takeover event, these losses are
of no different kind than the losses suffered following a wide variety of
other types of corporate restructuring that are not accompanied by a
change of control. Ultimately, the source of many of these dislocations is
an exogenous, hence unanticipated, change in the nature and direction
of market forces, which cause abrupt and sometimes radical shifts in
corporate policy. If this is the case, the logic ofcreating tailored remedies
for 'deserving' stakeholders on a takeover event is suspect. Far more
desirable is the adoption of generic adjustment programmes that are
aimed at reducing the private costs of adjustment faced by dislocated
employees and suppliers. As Trebilcock, Chandler, and Howse have
argued in relation to employees in the trade liberalization context, these
programmes would not differentiate among stakeholders on the basis of
the source of injury - simply the fact of injury would suffice to attract
public assistance. 92 This assistance would be forward-looking, and would
be aimed at salvaging a displaced worker's human capital by reintegrating
her back into the labour force as soon as possible.

91 Daniels, supra note 51, 220-6
92 Trebilcock et aI., supra note 44
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In an extremely provocative book entitled Why Americans Hate Politics,
E.J. Dionne Jr traces current political malaise in the United States to the
false choices posed by liberalism and conservatism [that] make it extremely
difficult for the perfectly obvious preferences of the American people to express
themselves in our politics. We are encouraging an 'either/or' politics based on
ideological preconceptions rather than a 'both/and' politics based· on ideas that
broadly unite US.9~

This observation has great cogency when applied to the stakeholder
debate. When capacious, fair-minded interpretations of widely shared
contractarian values are invoked, it is possible to support the extension
of humane and compassionate assistance to deserving victims of economic transitions, without forgoing the wealth-creating benefits that these
transitions confer on society at large. The challenge for policy-makers is
to move beyond the paralysing terms of the contractarian--communitarian
debate that has thus far limited the imaginative use of constructive policy
instruments.

93 E.]. Dionne ]r Why Americans Hate Politics (New York: Simon and Schuster 1991)
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